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Abstract	  
Governments	  in	  several	  European	  countries	  have	  developed	  policies	  that	  encourage	  companies	  to	  
share	  ownership	  of	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  with	  local	  communities.	  Shared	  ownership	  presumes	  
that	  company	  and	  community	  actors	  have	  common	  goals,	  can	  form	  effective	  partnerships	  and	  
negotiate	  fair	  outcomes.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  research	  on	  shared	  ownership,	  in	  particular,	  how	  it	  is	  
constructed	  by	  different	  actors,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  trust	  in	  shaping	  practice.	  This	  study	  addressed	  this	  
gap,	  drawing	  on	  qualitative	  data	  from	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  19	  UK	  stakeholders	  from	  industry,	  
community	  and	  advisory	  backgrounds.	  Thematic	  analysis	  revealed	  strong	  support	  for	  shared	  
ownership	  in	  principle,	  but	  significant	  challenges	  in	  practice.	  Actors	  held	  different	  rationales	  and	  
contrasting	  views	  on	  whether	  the	  policy	  should	  be	  discretionary	  or	  mandatory.	  A	  lack	  of	  trust	  was	  
prevalent,	  with	  developers	  expressing	  scepticism	  regarding	  the	  capacities	  and	  representativeness	  of	  
community	  actors;	  and	  community	  actors	  viewing	  developers	  as	  solely	  motivated	  by	  profit,	  
instrumentally	  using	  communities	  to	  gain	  planning	  consent.	  We	  conclude	  that	  for	  shared	  ownership	  
to	  become	  conventional	  practice,	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  provide	  mechanisms	  that	  facilitate	  partner	  
identification	  at	  an	  early	  stage,	  which	  can	  help	  to	  build	  relations	  of	  trust	  between	  actors,	  within	  a	  
more	  stable	  and	  supportive	  policy	  context.	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1. Introduction	  
In	  response	  to	  the	  threat	  of	  climate	  change,	  governments	  around	  the	  world	  are	  seeking	  to	  reduce	  
greenhouse	  gas	  emissions.	  In	  the	  UK,	  government	  policy	  aims	  to	  generate	  30%	  of	  electricity	  from	  
renewable	  energy	  sources	  by	  2020	  (DECC,	  2009)	  and	  increasing	  attention	  is	  being	  paid	  to	  roles	  that	  
different	  actors	  at	  different	  levels	  –	  individual,	  household,	  community	  and	  business	  organizations	  –	  
can	  play	  in	  the	  achievement	  of	  these	  climate	  change	  policies.	  Community	  actors	  are	  increasingly	  
leading	  on	  local	  energy	  projects,	  with	  over	  5000	  such	  initiatives	  reported	  in	  2013	  (DECC,	  2013).	  
However,	  the	  evidence	  base	  for	  the	  role	  of	  community	  energy	  in	  the	  energy	  transition	  is	  fragmented	  
(Seyfang,	  Park,	  &	  Smith,	  2013).	  Although	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  that	  these	  initiatives	  typically	  
receive	  high	  levels	  of	  public	  support	  (Devine-­‐Wright,	  2005;	  Warren	  &	  McFadyen,	  2010),	  they	  are	  also	  
small	  in	  scale	  and	  fragile	  due	  to	  their	  reliance	  upon	  unpaid	  volunteers	  (Seyfang	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  the	  
complexity	  of	  funding	  (and	  access	  to	  it,	  Seyfang	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  installation,	  legal	  and	  operational	  
arrangements	  that	  need	  to	  be	  put	  in	  place	  (Walker	  &	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2008),	  and	  their	  vulnerability	  to	  
wider	  shocks	  such	  as	  funding	  cuts	  and	  changing	  policy	  priorities	  (Seyfang	  &	  Smith,	  2007).	  By	  contrast,	  
private	  companies	  are	  often	  better	  equipped	  to	  deliver	  large-­‐scale	  energy	  projects	  (e.g.	  onshore	  
wind	  farms)	  by	  being	  able	  to	  spread	  financial	  risk,	  but	  these	  projects	  sometimes	  generate	  significant	  
negative	  local	  environmental	  impacts,	  often	  lead	  to	  local	  opposition,	  typically	  dubbed	  ‘NIMBYism’	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(Not	  In	  My	  Back	  Yard;	  Dear,	  1992),	  and	  may	  not	  always	  receive	  planning	  consent	  (Haggett,	  2008;	  
Toke,	  2005).	  	  
In	  response	  to	  these	  problems,	  there	  is	  an	  international	  trend	  to	  encourage	  the	  shared	  ownership	  of	  
renewable	  energy	  projects	  between	  company	  and	  community	  actors.	  Examples	  of	  specific	  projects	  
include	  the	  Middlegrunden	  offshore	  wind	  farm	  in	  Denmark,	  where	  50%	  of	  the	  project’s	  value	  is	  
owned	  by	  citizen	  shareholders,	  many	  of	  whom	  were	  local	  residents	  (Soerensen	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  the	  
Earlsburn	  wind	  farm	  in	  Scotland,	  where	  the	  Fintry	  community	  negotiated	  a	  1/15	  stake	  in	  a	  local	  wind	  
farm	  proposed	  by	  the	  developer,	  Falck	  Renewables.	  In	  terms	  of	  energy	  policies,	  the	  Danish	  
Renewable	  Energy	  Act	  (2009)	  obliges	  wind	  energy	  developers	  to	  share	  20%	  of	  the	  value	  of	  their	  
projects	  with	  local	  communities	  living	  within	  4.5km	  of	  the	  site	  (Bauwens,	  Gotchev,	  &	  Holstenkamp,	  
2016),	  with	  similar	  legislation	  in	  one	  German	  federal	  state	  and	  in	  Belgium	  (Maly,	  2014).	  It	  is	  notable	  
that	  these	  initiatives	  define	  a	  community	  in	  heterogeneous	  ways,	  with	  some	  emphasizing	  collective	  
involvement	  (e.g.	  Fintry)	  and	  others	  the	  involvement	  of	  individuals	  as	  share	  purchasers.	  Some	  
emphasise	  the	  involvement	  of	  local	  residents	  (e.g.	  share	  purchase	  only	  eligible	  to	  those	  within	  4.5km	  
of	  a	  project	  site	  in	  the	  Danish	  example),	  whereas	  others	  are	  open	  to	  the	  participation	  of	  citizens	  
living	  elsewhere	  (e.g.	  Middlegrunden).	  These	  differences	  reflect	  the	  persistent	  ambiguity	  of	  
‘community	  energy’	  as	  previously	  identified	  in	  the	  literature	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Walker	  &	  Devine-­‐
Wright,	  2008).	  
In	  the	  UK,	  the	  Government	  published	  its	  first	  Community	  Energy	  Strategy	  in	  2014,	  which	  included	  
proposals	  to	  encourage	  commercial	  developers	  to	  share	  ownership	  of	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  
with	  communities.	  To	  develop	  the	  policy	  in	  further	  detail,	  a	  Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force	  of	  industry	  
and	  community	  energy	  actors	  was	  set	  up.	  This	  Task	  Force	  (2014)	  stated	  that	  the	  main	  rationale	  of	  the	  
policy	  was	  to	  facilitate	  industry-­‐community	  models	  of	  shared	  ownership	  for	  new	  commercial	  onshore	  
renewable	  developments	  (Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force,	  2014).	  This	  innovation	  was	  introduced	  as	  a	  
recommendation	  to	  developers,	  rather	  than	  a	  mandatory	  action.	  However,	  it	  was	  made	  clear	  that	  
regulation	  would	  be	  introduced	  if	  progress	  on	  shared	  ownership	  was	  not	  apparent	  upon	  review.	  The	  
Task	  Force	  (2014)	  concluded	  that	  shared	  ownership	  should	  take	  place	  on	  projects	  valued	  at	  greater	  
than	  £2.5	  million	  and	  should	  involve	  communities	  (defined	  as	  a	  collective	  rather	  than	  an	  aggregate	  of	  
individuals)	  taking	  ownership	  of	  between	  5-­‐25%	  of	  a	  project’s	  overall	  value1.	  The	  mechanism	  of	  
shared	  ownership	  was	  left	  flexible,	  for	  example	  split	  ownership	  (communities	  buying	  a	  proportion	  of	  
the	  physical	  assets),	  shared	  revenue	  (buying	  the	  right	  to	  a	  future	  revenue	  stream)	  or	  joint	  venture	  
(working	  together	  to	  a	  create	  a	  joint	  venture	  to	  develop	  the	  project)	  were	  all	  stated	  as	  possible	  
options.	  	  
The	  policy	  innovation	  was	  premised	  on	  the	  view	  that	  shared	  ownership	  would	  help	  the	  deployment	  
of	  renewable	  energy,	  increase	  understanding	  and	  engagement,	  be	  cost-­‐neutral,	  inclusive,	  distinct	  
from	  the	  conventional	  community	  benefit	  funds,	  and	  be	  mutually	  beneficial	  for	  companies	  and	  
communities	  (Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force,	  2014).	  However,	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  practice,	  we	  
propose	  that	  shared	  ownership	  requires	  a	  number	  of	  inter-­‐dependent	  aspects	  to	  be	  present	  at	  both	  
‘micro’	  and	  ‘macro’	  levels.	  At	  the	  micro	  level,	  potential	  partners	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  policy,	  to	  
identify	  one	  another,	  to	  coordinate	  negotiations	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  a	  project,	  and	  to	  have	  
sufficient	  time	  available	  to	  engage	  in	  these	  practices.	  In	  addition,	  beliefs	  and	  values	  are	  important	  -­‐	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  In	  Scotland,	  separate	  guidance	  issued	  by	  the	  Scottish	  Executive	  supports	  shared	  ownership	  of	  smaller	  scale	  renewable	  
energy	  projects	  that	  are	  over	  50kW	  in	  scale	  (Local	  Energy	  Scotland,	  2015).	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the	  trust	  that	  may	  (or	  may	  not)	  reside	  or	  is	  built	  over	  time	  between	  different	  actors,	  the	  expectations	  
that	  each	  party	  has	  of	  the	  other	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011),	  the	  values	  that	  they	  hold	  (Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  
2013)	  and	  the	  perceived	  justice	  (e.g.	  Bickerstaff,	  Walker,	  &	  Bulkely,	  2013)	  of	  specific	  arrangements	  
that	  are	  available	  for	  negotiation.	  We	  acknowledge	  that	  these	  ‘micro’	  factors	  reside	  within,	  are	  
influenced	  by	  and	  in	  turn	  influence	  a	  ‘macro’	  context	  of	  national	  policies,	  institutions	  and	  norms	  
(Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  While	  each	  of	  these	  factors	  will	  influence	  the	  outcomes	  of	  a	  policy	  on	  shared	  
ownership,	  our	  main	  focus	  in	  this	  research	  is	  upon	  the	  ‘micro’	  level	  of	  how	  relationships	  develop	  
between	  company	  and	  community	  actors,	  and	  the	  underlying	  issues	  of	  trust	  and	  justice	  that	  are	  
perceived	  to	  influence	  these.	  	  
	  
Despite	  the	  international	  trend	  towards	  shared	  ownership,	  there	  is	  a	  surprising	  dearth	  of	  research	  on	  
this	  subject	  to	  date,	  leading	  to	  an	  absence	  of	  evidence	  to	  inform	  policy-­‐making	  (Slee,	  2015).	  For	  
example,	  we	  are	  unaware	  of	  any	  research,	  conducted	  either	  in	  the	  UK	  or	  elsewhere,	  that	  has	  
investigated	  how	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements	  between	  communities	  and	  developers	  are	  formed	  
in	  practice.	  This	  research	  aims	  to	  address	  this	  gap.	  We	  draw	  upon	  in-­‐depth	  interviews	  with	  UK	  
stakeholders	  from	  industry,	  community,	  and	  advisory	  backgrounds.	  Taking	  a	  social	  constructionist	  
approach,	  our	  focus	  lies	  in	  the	  way	  that	  shared	  ownership	  is	  interpreted	  by	  the	  different	  actors	  
involved,	  including	  developers,	  community	  representatives	  and	  intermediaries	  (i.e.	  boundary	  
organizations	  engaging	  in	  relational	  work	  to	  bridge	  between	  different	  actors,	  see	  Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  
2013).	  Many	  studies	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  views	  and	  experiences	  of	  one	  type	  of	  actor	  (e.g.	  how	  
developers	  ‘imagine’	  publics,	  for	  example	  (Burningham	  et	  al.,	  2015)	  or	  the	  motivations	  of	  community	  
energy	  actors	  (e.g.	  Seyfang	  et	  al.,	  2013),	  which	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  get	  a	  comprehensive	  picture	  of	  
the	  field	  and	  how	  different	  views	  (might)	  come	  together.	  As	  Walker	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  state,	  there	  is	  a	  
need	  for	  a	  more	  holistic	  and	  symmetrical	  picture,	  giving	  equal	  attention	  to	  communities	  and	  the	  
commercial	  actors	  that	  instigate	  technology	  projects.	  The	  paper	  progresses	  as	  follows;	  first	  a	  
theoretical	  background	  is	  provided	  whereafter	  the	  method	  is	  presented,	  followed	  by	  our	  analytic	  
findings,	  and	  conclusions	  and	  recommendations	  for	  future	  research.	  	  
	  
2. Theoretical	  background	  
	  
2.1	  Identifying	  partners	  and	  building	  relationships	  
For	  shared	  ownership	  to	  come	  about,	  community	  groups	  have	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  opportunities	  
around	  shared	  ownership	  and	  developers	  have	  to	  identify	  the	  communities	  (and	  community	  leaders)	  
to	  engage	  with.	  As	  Walker	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  state,	  community	  is	  an	  ambiguous	  term	  used	  in	  various	  ways,	  
for	  example	  to	  distinguish	  an	  actor,	  scale	  of	  activity,	  a	  spatial	  setting	  or	  a	  form	  of	  network.	  
Communities	  can	  be	  “transient	  and	  dynamic,	  fracturing	  as	  events	  unfold	  and	  relationships	  evolve”	  
(Walker	  2011,	  778).	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  ‘community’	  involved	  in	  shared	  ownership	  projects	  
cannot	  be	  taken	  as	  a	  given;	  instead	  the	  ways	  that	  the	  ‘community’	  becomes	  constituted	  through	  the	  
process	  of	  shared	  ownership	  needs	  to	  be	  carefully	  researched	  by	  paying	  attention	  to	  divergent	  
framings	  held	  by	  the	  different	  actors	  involved.	  Furthermore,	  as	  stated	  by	  the	  Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  
Force	  (2014),	  there	  may	  not	  always	  be	  a	  previously	  formed	  community	  group	  or	  members	  who	  are	  
willing	  or	  able	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  necessary	  negotiations	  with	  developers.	  	  
	  
2.2	  Rationales	  for	  engaging	  in	  shared	  ownership	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For	  shared	  ownership	  to	  come	  about,	  there	  have	  to	  be	  certain	  expectations	  of	  positive	  outcomes	  
both	  for	  communities	  and	  for	  developers.	  For	  a	  community,	  working	  with	  a	  commercial	  partner	  
might	  enable	  participation	  in	  a	  larger	  scale	  project,	  as	  developers	  can	  spread	  the	  risk	  between	  
different	  projects	  (Nolden,	  2013)	  compared	  to	  community-­‐led	  approaches	  where	  the	  total	  risk	  is	  
borne	  by	  the	  communities	  themselves.	  Communities	  typically	  benefit	  from	  a	  utility-­‐led	  energy	  
project	  through	  a	  community	  fund	  (where	  communities	  usually	  receive	  a	  fixed	  sum	  of	  money	  
annually	  to	  spend	  within	  the	  local	  area;	  Aitken,	  2010).	  However,	  research	  shows	  that	  these	  payments	  
are	  often	  less	  than	  one	  percent	  of	  the	  total	  profit	  of	  many	  large-­‐scale	  wind	  projects	  (Slee,	  2015)	  and	  
full	  ownership	  of	  the	  project,	  and	  therefore	  control	  over	  decision-­‐making,	  remains	  largely	  with	  the	  
developer.	  In	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements,	  control	  over	  part	  of	  the	  project	  lies	  with	  community	  
and	  returns	  might	  be	  considerably	  larger,	  depending	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  negotiations	  between	  the	  
community	  and	  the	  developer.	  	  
	  
Additionally,	  for	  local	  residents,	  buying	  shares	  in	  a	  shared	  ownership	  project	  reflects	  a	  way	  of	  
participating	  in	  renewable	  energy	  (Walker	  &	  Cass,	  2007)	  that	  is	  considerably	  less	  expensive	  than	  
buying,	  for	  example,	  solar	  panels	  on	  an	  individual	  basis.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  though	  that	  community	  
initiatives	  offer	  other	  potential	  benefits	  than	  merely	  financial	  ones	  (Rogers,	  Simmons,	  Convery,	  &	  
Weatherall,	  2008;	  Walker,	  2011).	  These	  initiatives	  are	  often	  said	  to	  provide	  social	  incentives	  for	  
people	  to	  join	  such	  as	  increased	  social	  cohesion	  (Seyfang	  &	  Haxeltine,	  2012),	  a	  sense	  of	  duty,	  
experimenting	  with	  alternative	  ways	  of	  living,	  and	  demonstrating	  that	  alternatives	  to	  the	  existing	  
energy	  system	  are	  possible	  (Seyfang,	  2009).	  Such	  social	  incentives	  may	  boost	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
citizen	  mobilization	  and	  reinforce	  positive	  behavioral	  change.	  In	  addition,	  learning	  processes	  might	  
occur	  between	  developers	  and	  communities,	  increasing	  their	  skills	  and	  knowledge	  in	  the	  renewable	  
energy	  field.	  	  
	  
For	  developers,	  shared	  ownership	  might	  bring	  alternative	  sources	  of	  finance	  and	  risk	  sharing	  during	  
project	  development.	  Actively	  engaging	  with	  communities	  might	  be	  an	  objective	  in	  itself	  for	  some	  
companies,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  reduce	  the	  risk	  of	  public	  objections	  to	  their	  projects,	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  
prospect	  of	  securing	  planning	  consent.	  It	  is	  relevant	  to	  consider	  broader	  literature	  on	  public	  
participation	  here,	  in	  particular	  research	  on	  the	  multiple	  rationales	  for	  engaging	  with	  publics	  (Fiorino,	  
1989;	  Stirling,	  2005).	  Stirling	  (2005)	  identified	  three	  predominant	  motivations,	  including	  normative	  
(e.g.,	  participation	  is	  judged	  to	  be	  the	  right	  thing	  to	  do),	  substantive	  (e.g.,	  a	  way	  to	  achieve	  better	  
outcomes	  for	  all),	  and	  instrumental	  (e.g.,	  a	  better	  way	  to	  achieve	  ends).	  Our	  research	  aims	  to	  reveal	  
these,	  with	  instrumental	  motives	  expected	  to	  be	  most	  likely	  occurring	  amongst	  commercial	  partners	  
in	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  main	  potential	  problems	  that	  might	  arise	  when	  considering	  these	  rationales	  is	  a	  conflict	  of	  
interest.	  Thus,	  a	  certain	  match	  between	  these	  different	  rationales	  may	  need	  to	  be	  found,	  for	  
community	  actors	  and	  developers	  to	  find	  each	  other	  and	  engage	  in	  successful	  partnerships.	  
Importantly,	  this	  not	  only	  depends	  upon	  actor	  rationales	  and	  potential	  willingness	  to	  engage,	  but	  
also	  on	  the	  expectations	  that	  each	  holds	  of	  the	  other’s	  rationales.	  	  
2.3	  Trust	  and	  the	  expectations	  of	  different	  actors	  	  
Trust	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  an	  important	  issue	  both	  for	  developer-­‐led	  and	  community-­‐led	  energy	  
projects	  (e.g.,	  Boon	  &	  Dieperink,	  2014;	  Gill	  Seyfang	  &	  Haxeltine,	  2012;	  Walker,	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  
Hunter,	  High,	  &	  Evans,	  2010).	  According	  to	  Putnam	  (1993)	  trust	  is	  self-­‐reinforcing:	  initial	  trust	  leads	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to	  cooperation,	  which	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  increasing	  levels	  of	  trust.	  Initial	  trust	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  influenced	  
by	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  expectations	  that	  different	  actors	  have	  of	  one	  another.	  As	  Walker	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
state,	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  when	  and	  how	  actors	  decide	  to	  engage	  with	  one	  another	  (or	  not)	  by	  
looking	  at	  the	  expectations	  they	  hold	  about	  different	  parties	  involved.	  	  
Developers	  may	  have	  expectations	  about	  the	  public	  generally	  and	  about	  community	  representatives	  
in	  particular,	  how	  they	  will	  respond	  to	  their	  proposals,	  how	  the	  decision	  process	  should	  operate,	  and	  
what	  involvement	  of	  the	  public	  should	  entail	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  It	  has	  been	  argued,	  for	  example,	  
that	  the	  ‘NIMBY’	  (Not	  In	  My	  Back	  Yard)	  label	  is	  a	  particularly	  negative	  way	  that	  commercial	  
organizations	  might	  think	  about	  publics	  (Dear,	  1992;	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2012).	  From	  this	  perspective,	  
objectors	  are	  primarily	  viewed	  as	  irrational,	  selfish	  and	  ignorant	  by	  developers	  (Burningham	  et	  al.,	  
2015),	  with	  consequent	  implications	  for	  strategies	  of	  engagement,	  technology	  design,	  and	  locational	  
choice	  (Barnett,	  Burningham,	  Walker,	  &	  Cass,	  2012;	  Cass	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  In	  a	  similar	  
vein,	  expectations	  that	  communities	  may	  have	  of	  developers	  and	  their	  incentives	  and	  goals	  for	  
engaging	  in	  these	  collaborations	  might	  play	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  whether	  or	  not	  trust	  is	  present	  and	  
successful	  collaboration	  can	  be	  established.	  Studies	  of	  renewable	  energy	  conflicts	  have	  already	  
revealed	  how	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  developers	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  underlying	  public	  objections	  (e.g.	  
Barry,	  Ellis,	  &	  Robinson,	  2008;	  Cass	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  Different	  perceptions	  lead	  to	  specific	  forms	  of	  
engagement	  with,	  and	  by,	  the	  public,	  which	  in	  turn	  can	  lead	  to	  oppositional	  responses	  potentially	  
causing	  negative	  feedback	  loops	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  
	  
These	  perceptions	  are	  not	  static,	  and	  “rather	  than	  seeing	  people	  as	  being	  predisposed	  to	  oppose	  or	  
support	  particular	  developments,	  we	  might	  view	  local	  responses	  as	  emergent	  and	  negotiated”	  
(Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011,	  33).	  Expectations	  and	  trust	  will	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  different	  communication	  
strategies	  used	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  project	  development.	  For	  example,	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  
developers	  typically	  engage	  in	  one-­‐way	  communication	  with	  communities	  when	  developing	  
commercial	  energy	  projects,	  and	  when	  a	  two-­‐way	  form	  of	  consultation	  is	  engaged	  in,	  it	  is	  carefully	  
managed	  to	  prevent	  opponents	  from	  collectively	  expressing	  their	  opinions	  (Barnett	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
	  
In	  addition,	  time	  asymmetries	  in	  delivery	  introduce	  risk	  into	  a	  transaction	  for	  parties	  who	  must	  invest	  
resources	  before	  receiving	  a	  return	  (Coleman,	  1990).	  For	  developers,	  this	  might	  be	  a	  concern	  with	  
whether	  the	  communities	  can	  deliver	  sufficient	  capital	  investment	  and	  ensure	  local	  support.	  For	  
communities,	  the	  question	  may	  be	  whether	  the	  developers	  will	  keep	  their	  part	  of	  the	  deal	  in	  offering	  
a	  share	  of	  the	  project	  once	  planning	  permission	  has	  been	  consented.	  According	  to	  the	  Shared	  
Ownership	  Task	  Force	  (2014),	  discussions	  should	  take	  place	  at	  the	  earliest	  practical	  point	  in	  project	  
development.	  Developers	  are	  not	  expected	  to	  present	  communities	  with	  a	  formal,	  fully	  worked-­‐
through	  offer	  at	  an	  early	  stage.	  While	  this	  may	  increase	  the	  sense	  of	  ownership	  for	  communities,	  
increase	  flexibility	  on	  both	  sides,	  and	  lessen	  risk	  investments	  in	  financial	  terms,	  early	  engagement	  
might	  also	  increase	  uncertainty	  since	  little	  clear	  information	  is	  provided	  (Cass	  et	  al.,	  2010)	  and	  both	  
parties	  can	  generally	  “pull	  back”	  at	  any	  stage.	  	  
	  
Finally,	  trust	  between	  these	  actors	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  wider	  institutional	  context	  within	  
which	  these	  potential	  partnerships	  take	  place	  (especially	  given	  that	  these	  partnerships	  have	  been	  
recommended	  by	  the	  government).	  For	  example,	  if	  renewable	  energy	  developers	  in	  the	  UK	  feel	  
'targeted'	  by	  recent	  policy	  changes	  (e.g.	  changes	  to	  the	  Renewables	  Obligation	  and	  Feed-­‐in	  Tariff)	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they	  may	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  trust	  other	  government	  pronouncements	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  support	  these	  
arrangements.	  Indeed,	  this	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  communities	  involved.	  	  
	  
2.4	  Procedural	  and	  distributional	  justice	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  issues	  of	  trust,	  concepts	  of	  justice	  are	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  policy	  and	  practice	  of	  
shared	  ownership.	  Trust	  is	  a	  concept	  which	  is	  often	  linked	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  fairness,	  and	  it	  is	  stated	  
that	  it	  is	  in	  fact	  impossible	  to	  understand	  the	  role	  of	  one	  of	  these	  concepts	  without	  the	  other	  (Van	  
den	  Bos	  &	  Lind,	  2002)	  -­‐	  judgments	  of	  fairness	  can	  lead	  to	  trust	  and	  vice	  versa	  (Huijts,	  Molin,	  &	  Steg,	  
2012).	  More	  generally,	  the	  relevance	  of	  ideas	  of	  justice	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  low	  carbon	  transition	  is	  
increasingly	  well	  recognized	  (e.g.	  Bickerstaff	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Wolsink,	  2007;	  Cowell,	  Bristow,	  &	  Munday,	  
2010).	  Two	  dimensions	  of	  energy	  justice	  that	  are	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  shared	  ownership	  are	  
procedural	  justice	  and	  distributional	  justice	  (Bickerstaff	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Huijts	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
Procedural	  justice	  concerns	  the	  perceived	  fairness	  of	  a	  decision-­‐making	  process,	  and	  is	  closely	  
related	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  participation	  of	  different	  actors	  within	  these	  shared	  ownership	  
arrangements.	  Arnstein	  (1969)	  defined	  citizen	  participation	  as	  "the	  redistribution	  of	  power	  that	  
enables	  the	  have-­‐not	  citizens,	  presently	  excluded	  from	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  processes,	  to	  be	  
deliberately	  included	  in	  the	  future"	  (Arnstein,	  1969,	  3).	  In	  the	  case	  of	  shared	  ownership,	  procedural	  
justice	  is	  relevant	  to	  several	  issues,	  including	  timing	  (i.e.	  the	  stage	  of	  project	  development	  when	  
developers	  and	  community	  actors	  begin	  communicating	  and	  negotiating	  with	  each	  other),	  
transparency	  (how	  much	  information	  is	  provided	  in	  developer-­‐led	  projects	  to	  community	  leaders),	  
and	  equity	  (whether	  community	  representatives	  have	  the	  status	  and	  resources	  to	  effectively	  take	  a	  
partnership	  role	  in	  the	  project,	  contributing	  to	  decision-­‐making	  and	  negotiating	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  project	  
between	  5	  and	  25%).	  	  
	  
Distributive	  justice	  concerns	  the	  ways	  the	  distribution	  of	  costs,	  risks,	  and	  benefits	  between	  different	  
actors	  is	  perceived.	  Considerations	  of	  equity	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits	  have	  been	  
shown	  to	  be	  important	  in	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  in	  general	  (e.g.	  Gross,	  2007).	  This	  concept	  not	  
only	  concerns	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  between	  developers	  and	  communities	  but	  also	  within	  
communities,	  with	  benefit	  provision	  being	  shown	  to	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  increase	  intra-­‐community	  
tensions	  (Aitken,	  2010).	  Such	  concerns	  are	  not	  only	  confined	  to	  company-­‐led	  projects,	  but	  also	  apply	  
to	  community-­‐led	  initiatives.	  For	  example,	  Cass	  et	  al.	  (2010)	  detail	  an	  award	  winning	  community	  
wind	  farm	  which	  became	  entangled	  in	  a	  fractious	  within-­‐community	  debate	  concerning	  the	  
distribution	  of	  benefits	  beyond	  a	  small	  group	  of	  local	  farmers.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  shared	  ownership,	  
distributional	  justice	  issues	  are	  likely	  to	  involve	  the	  proportion	  of	  project	  ownership	  that	  is	  offered	  to	  
the	  community	  by	  the	  developer	  (from	  5-­‐25%)	  and	  the	  rules	  put	  in	  place	  about	  share	  purchase	  (e.g.	  
how	  the	  share	  price	  is	  set,	  whether	  local	  residents	  are	  offered	  more	  favorable	  terms	  for	  purchase	  in	  
comparison	  to	  those	  living	  outside	  of	  the	  area,	  whether	  non-­‐purchasers	  living	  locally	  may	  also	  
receive	  some	  financial	  benefits	  from	  the	  project).	  
	  
2.5	  Bringing	  the	  two	  together:	  where	  to	  place	  shared	  ownership	  
These	  different	  justice	  concepts	  have	  been	  brought	  together	  in	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  framework	  
proposed	  by	  Walker	  and	  Devine-­‐Wright	  (2008)	  to	  describe	  community	  energy.	  They	  identified	  “a	  
process	  dimension,	  concerned	  with	  who	  a	  project	  is	  developed	  and	  run	  by,	  who	  is	  involved	  and	  has	  
influence”	  which	  corresponds	  to	  procedural	  justice,	  and	  “	  an	  outcome	  dimension	  concerned	  with	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how	  the	  outcomes	  of	  a	  project	  are	  spatially	  and	  socially	  distributed	  -­‐	  in	  other	  words	  who	  the	  project	  
is	  for;	  who	  is	  it	  that	  benefits	  in	  economic	  or	  social	  terms”	  which	  corresponds	  to	  distributive	  justice	  
(Walker	  &	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2008,	  498;	  see	  Figure	  1).	  It	  was	  suggested	  that	  community	  energy	  projects	  
are	  ideally	  located	  in	  the	  top	  right	  quadrant	  of	  the	  framework,	  founded	  upon	  certain	  values	  that	  are	  
distinct	  from	  –	  even	  a	  mirror	  image	  of	  –	  commercial	  projects:	  work	  conducted	  voluntarily,	  driven	  by	  
environmental	  and	  social	  concerns,	  maximizing	  local	  participation,	  and	  benefit	  sharing	  (Hielscher,	  
Seyfang	  &	  Smith,	  2013;	  Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Walker	  &	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2008).	  Yet	  the	  labeling	  of	  
different	  spaces	  in	  the	  framework	  (A-­‐C)	  is	  testimony	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  community	  energy	  is	  an	  
ambiguous	  concept.	  Although	  community	  energy	  is	  considered	  to	  have	  a	  “distinct	  organizational	  
form,	  different	  contextual	  situation	  and	  alternative	  rationales”	  compared	  to	  more	  market	  based	  
organizations	  (Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  1),	  in	  reality	  projects	  are	  heterogeneous,	  with	  some	  initiatives	  
aiming	  to	  achieve	  large-­‐scale	  technology	  deployment	  and	  operating	  as	  professional	  social	  enterprises	  
(cf.	  Hatzl,	  Seebauer,	  Fleiss	  &	  Posch,	  2016).	  By	  contrast,	  developer-­‐led	  projects	  are	  placed	  by	  the	  
authors	  on	  the	  bottom	  left	  of	  the	  picture,	  suggesting	  typically	  low	  levels	  of	  public	  participation	  and	  
local	  benefit	  sharing.	  
Figure	  1.	  Understanding	  community	  energy	  in	  relation	  to	  project	  process	  and	  outcome	  dimensions	  









It	  is	  instructive	  to	  note	  that	  the	  UK	  Department	  of	  Energy	  and	  Climate	  Change	  (DECC)	  has	  placed	  
shared	  ownership	  in	  the	  bottom	  right	  of	  a	  similar	  framework	  (DECC,	  2013,	  16;	  see	  Figure	  2),	  
indicating	  a	  view	  of	  shared	  ownership	  as	  comprising	  higher	  levels	  of	  local	  benefit	  sharing	  compared	  
to	  commercial	  projects	  but	  lower	  levels	  of	  community	  participation	  than	  community-­‐led	  projects.	  
This	  suggests	  that	  policy	  makers	  consider	  trade-­‐offs	  between	  procedural	  and	  distributional	  justice	  to	  
be	  likely	  and	  perhaps	  acceptable	  to	  communities.	  However,	  it	  is	  by	  no	  means	  certain	  that	  this	  may	  be	  
the	  case	  -­‐	  indeed	  the	  literature	  suggests	  the	  contrary.	  Gross	  (2007)	  concluded	  that	  publics	  might	  
accept	  the	  negative	  outcomes	  of	  developer-­‐led	  wind	  farm	  projects,	  provided	  that	  decision-­‐making	  
procedures	  were	  perceived	  to	  be	  fair.	  The	  figure	  might	  also	  indicate	  a	  preference	  for	  developing	  
(community)	  renewable	  energy	  within	  a	  market-­‐led,	  liberalized	  and	  privatized	  institutional	  context	  













Whether	  these	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements	  are	  successful	  in	  practice	  might	  depend	  on	  the	  fit	  
between	  the	  different	  motives	  of	  developers	  and	  communities.	  Here	  might	  lie	  the	  greatest	  potential	  
for	  intermediaries	  in	  	  “brokering	  and	  managing	  partnerships”	  between	  developers	  and	  communities	  
(Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  These	  intermediaries	  may	  for	  example	  be	  able	  to	  assist	  developers	  in	  
identifying	  local	  community	  groups	  if	  needed	  and	  provide	  both	  parties	  with	  some	  of	  the	  necessary	  
information	  to	  engage	  in	  negotiations.	  However,	  the	  authors	  state	  that	  efforts	  by	  intermediaries	  to	  
grow	  community	  energy	  projects,	  if	  involving	  a	  reduction	  in	  diversity	  may	  be	  	  “a	  price	  that	  many	  
community	  energy	  activists	  may	  not	  wish	  to	  pay”	  (Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  2013,	  878).	  	  
Arising	  from	  these	  considerations,	  we	  pose	  three	  research	  questions:	  
• How	  do	  developers,	  communities	  and	  intermediary	  actors	  view	  the	  policy	  of	  shared	  ownership?	  
• What	  are	  the	  practical	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  communities	  and	  companies	  in	  negotiating	  shared	  
ownership?	  
• To	  what	  extent	  do	  concepts	  of	  trust	  and	  justice	  play	  a	  role	  in	  the	  ways	  that	  shared	  ownership	  
arrangements	  are	  viewed	  by	  different	  actors?	  
	  
3. Method	  
We	  adopt	  a	  social	  constructionist	  perspective	  to	  investigate	  how	  shared	  ownership	  is	  interpreted	  by	  
different	  actors.	  The	  focus	  lies	  on	  rhetorical	  discourse,	  that	  is	  the	  structures	  that	  relate	  linguistic	  
elements	  (e.g.	  words	  and	  phrases)	  to	  objects	  and	  practices	  in	  a	  contingent	  manner,	  rejecting	  a	  neat	  
distinction	  between	  linguistic	  and	  non-­‐linguistic	  reality	  (LaClau	  &	  Mouffe,	  1985).	  This	  perspective	  has	  
already	  been	  productively	  applied	  to	  research	  on	  the	  social	  acceptance	  of	  renewable	  energy	  (e.g.	  
Ellis,	  Barry,	  &	  Robinson,	  2007;	  Haggett,	  2008;	  Leibenath	  &	  Otto,	  2014).	  Given	  that	  it	  is,	  in	  principle,	  
impossible	  to	  identify	  what	  a	  discursive	  element	  ‘really’	  means,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  reveal	  matters	  of	  
power	  that	  institute	  a	  certain	  discourse,	  to	  examine	  how	  each	  discourse	  privileges	  certain	  types	  of	  
knowledge	  and	  devalues	  others.	  Hence,	  power	  and	  knowledge	  are	  inextricably	  interwoven	  (Dryzek,	  
1997).	  	  
We	  used	  a	  qualitative	  method	  to	  study	  how	  different	  actors	  view	  shared	  ownership.	  To	  ensure	  
rigour,	  we	  were	  guided	  by	  the	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  qualitative	  research	  identified	  by	  Baxter	  and	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Eyles	  (1997)	  comprising	  transferability	  (making	  what	  occurred	  intelligible	  and	  transparent	  to	  readers;	  
revealing	  the	  history	  of	  the	  research,	  and	  description	  of	  study	  context);	  credibility	  (the	  plausibility	  of	  
connections	  made	  between	  the	  experiences	  of	  participants	  and	  the	  concepts	  used	  to	  describe	  them);	  
dependability	  (consistency	  with	  which	  the	  same	  constructs	  are	  matched	  with	  the	  same	  
phenomenon,	  ensuring	  the	  logic	  of	  interpretation	  is	  not	  partisan);	  and	  confirmability	  (the	  ability	  to	  
audit	  the	  analytic	  process	  through	  personal	  reflection	  of	  how	  decisions	  are	  made	  and	  how	  the	  
interests	  or	  perspectives	  of	  the	  inquirers	  may	  influence	  interpretations).	  	  
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  were	  used	  to	  collect	  data,	  as	  it	  is	  a	  suitable	  method	  to	  probe	  participants’	  
understandings	  of	  a	  topic	  in	  some	  depth.	  Interviews	  were	  conducted	  with	  19	  shared	  ownership	  
stakeholders	  in	  April,	  May	  and	  September	  2015.	  A	  purposeful	  sampling	  strategy	  (Coyne,	  1997)	  was	  
adopted,	  which	  sought	  to	  capture	  a	  range	  of	  perspectives	  on	  shared	  ownership	  from	  actors	  with	  
different	  interests	  and	  backgrounds.	  Participants	  included	  employees	  of	  renewable	  energy	  
companies	  (n	  =	  7),	  community	  actors	  working	  on	  specific	  energy	  projects	  (n	  =	  6),	  and	  intermediaries	  
who	  were	  working	  in	  advisory	  or	  support	  roles	  across	  multiple	  community	  initiatives	  (n	  =	  6).	  A	  
feature	  of	  our	  analytic	  approach	  was	  an	  iterative	  process	  of	  proposition	  and	  challenge	  involving	  both	  
authors,	  a	  process	  of	  discussion	  that	  has	  been	  recommended	  to	  increase	  the	  dependability	  of	  small-­‐
sample	  qualitative	  energy	  research	  (Bickerstaff,	  Devine-­‐Wright	  &	  Butler,	  2015).	  	  	  
For	  the	  company	  representatives,	  we	  sought	  to	  reach	  those	  employees	  that	  were	  working	  directly	  on	  
shared	  ownership	  and	  seeking	  to	  engage	  with	  community	  actors.	  Participants	  were	  identified	  
through	  a	  snowball	  method	  (Marshall,	  1996)	  and	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  both	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  and	  
by	  phone.	  Each	  interview	  was	  tailored	  to	  the	  stakeholder	  involved,	  but	  a	  standard	  approach	  was	  
taken	  to	  ask	  questions	  about	  participant’s	  general	  interest	  in	  the	  area,	  why	  they	  might	  engage	  in	  
shared	  ownership	  arrangements,	  their	  expectations	  of	  other	  parties,	  ways	  of	  negotiating,	  how	  they	  
communicate	  with	  one	  another,	  views	  on	  the	  policy,	  and	  their	  experience	  to	  date	  with	  shared	  
ownership	  arrangements	  or	  attempts.	  Our	  understanding	  of	  the	  data	  was	  informed	  by	  a	  Community	  
Energy	  seminar	  that	  took	  place	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Exeter	  attended	  by	  policy	  makers,	  development	  
companies,	  community	  actors,	  third	  parties	  and	  academics,	  at	  which	  notes	  were	  taken	  of	  group	  
discussions.	  
Each	  interview	  was	  recorded	  with	  the	  permission	  of	  the	  participants,	  transcribed	  and	  subsequently	  
coded	  using	  Atlas.ti.	  Analysis,	  encompassing	  coding	  and	  interpretation,	  was	  conducted	  by	  both	  
authors	  in	  an	  iterative	  process.	  A	  partly	  deductive,	  partly	  inductive	  cycle	  was	  followed	  during	  the	  
analyses,	  which	  followed	  a	  thematic	  approach	  (Joffe,	  2012).	  Initially,	  coding	  was	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  
themes	  prevalent	  within	  each	  individual	  interview.	  A	  second	  stage	  looked	  to	  compare	  the	  themes	  
expressed	  by	  participants’	  within	  sample	  categories	  (developer,	  community	  and	  intermediary)	  to	  
check	  for	  similarity	  and	  homogeneity.	  The	  final	  stage	  of	  analysis	  sought	  to	  identify	  how	  themes	  were	  
expressed	  between	  categories,	  with	  a	  particular	  interest	  in	  comparing	  discourses	  between	  developer	  
and	  community	  actors.	  Within	  each	  stage	  and	  continuing	  during	  the	  writing	  up	  of	  the	  research,	  
discussions	  took	  place	  between	  the	  authors	  in	  which	  interpretations	  were	  proposed	  and	  challenged	  





4. Analytic	  findings	  
4.1	  The	  emergence	  of	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements	  	  
We	  found	  no	  evidence	  of	  shared	  ownership	  projects	  that	  had	  been	  successfully	  completed	  since	  the	  
2014	  Task	  Force	  had	  been	  formed.	  This	  is	  not	  surprising	  since	  the	  recommendation	  of	  shared	  
ownership	  is	  still	  a	  fairly	  recent	  development.	  However,	  many	  projects	  were	  in	  process,	  with	  
participants	  involved	  in	  looking	  for	  a	  partner,	  negotiating	  terms,	  and/or	  moving	  forward	  in	  
partnership.	  Almost	  all	  interviewees,	  developers	  and	  community	  actors,	  indicated	  that	  often	  
intermediaries	  were	  of	  great	  help	  to	  identify	  one	  another	  and	  rather	  crucial	  for	  getting	  the	  process	  of	  
shared	  ownership	  started,	  supporting	  what	  Hargreaves	  et	  al.	  (2013)	  called	  the	  "brokering"	  role	  of	  
these	  actors.	  For	  developers,	  this	  entails	  clearly	  more	  than	  just	  receiving	  assistance	  about	  who	  to	  
partner	  or	  negotiate	  with,	  it	  is	  also	  a	  crucial	  stage	  in	  constituting	  ‘the	  community’	  that	  are	  considered	  
to	  be	  affected	  by	  their	  proposals.	  
"There	  are	  plenty	  of	  organizations	  bringing	  the	  two	  together	  at	  the	  moment.	  If	  you	  are	  a	  commercial	  
developer,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  hard	  to	  find	  communities	  to	  work	  with	  and	  to	  find	  support”	  (Intermediary	  
4)	  
	  “We	  came	  to	  these	  communities	  mostly	  via	  the	  local	  government.	  So	  we	  go	  to	  the	  planners	  of	  the	  
local	  government	  and	  ehm	  and	  ask	  them	  for	  their	  views	  on	  what	  communities	  we	  should	  be	  talking	  
to”	  (Developer	  3)	  
Several	  communication	  strategies	  are	  engaged	  in	  at	  different	  stages	  of	  the	  process.	  Most	  often,	  
when	  a	  community	  is	  approached	  by	  a	  developer,	  letters	  are	  sent	  to	  part	  of	  the	  community	  (a	  
somewhat	  random	  sample)	  to	  inform	  the	  community	  about	  the	  plans,	  in	  some	  cases	  followed	  by	  a	  
consulting	  round	  via	  focus	  groups.	  Often,	  there	  is	  an	  exhibition	  to	  inform	  the	  community	  at	  some	  
point	  in	  time.	  Greater	  diversity	  in	  the	  experience	  of	  communication	  strategies	  was	  found	  within	  our	  
sample	  of	  community	  energy	  actors.	  In	  some	  cases,	  these	  actors	  actively	  seek	  partnerships	  with	  
developers,	  whereas	  in	  others	  they	  just	  received	  an	  invitation	  from	  a	  firm.	  In	  one	  case,	  the	  process	  of	  
shared	  ownership	  was	  initiated	  only	  by	  chance:	  
“They	  were	  proposing	  a	  13	  megawatt	  solar	  farm	  and	  I	  heard	  about	  it	  because	  it	  is	  really	  on	  my	  
doorstep,	  but	  other	  than	  that	  I	  never	  knew	  this	  was	  planned.	  So	  I	  went	  to	  a	  meeting	  myself	  and	  just	  
asked	  like	  what	  is	  happening	  and	  why	  not	  engage	  with	  our	  community.	  But	  I	  could	  also	  have	  missed	  it	  
completely	  of	  course”	  (Community	  actor	  4)	  
Several	  developers	  reported	  difficulties	  already	  in	  early	  stages	  of	  project	  development	  in	  gaining	  the	  
involvement	  of	  local	  community	  actors	  and	  in	  securing	  local	  support	  for	  shared	  ownership:	  	  
“We	  have	  offered	  shared	  ownership	  three	  times	  and	  every	  time	  the	  community	  preferred	  to	  take	  
community	  benefits	  instead”	  (Developer	  4)	  
This	  does	  raise	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  shared	  ownership	  is	  actually	  sought	  by	  community	  actors	  
more	  generally,	  a	  subject	  that	  has	  received	  little	  research	  attention	  to	  date	  and	  which	  will	  be	  




4.2	  Rationales	  for	  participating	  in	  shared	  ownership	  	  
Community	  actors	  and	  developers	  expressed	  different	  rationales	  for	  engaging	  in	  shared	  ownership.	  
Community	  representatives	  were	  most	  likely	  to	  propose	  a	  normative	  rationale,	  seeking	  to	  participate	  
in	  Shared	  Ownership	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  empowering	  local	  people	  and	  increasing	  knowledge	  and	  skills,	  
as	  pointed	  out	  by	  Seyfang	  and	  Haxeltine	  (2012):	  
“For	  communities,	  ownership	  is	  more	  than	  just	  the	  money	  of	  course,	  you	  can	  contribute	  to	  real	  
empowerment”	  (Community	  actor	  4)	  
However,	  community	  actors	  also	  expressed	  an	  instrumental	  rationale	  to	  increase	  financial	  gain,	  since	  
engaging	  in	  partnerships	  with	  developers	  was	  often	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  larger	  scale	  
project	  than	  would	  be	  feasible	  otherwise	  (as	  proposed	  by	  Nolden,	  2013),	  and	  lowering	  the	  risk	  of	  
investment.	  	  
“We	  certainly	  don´t	  believe	  we	  can	  do	  such	  a	  project	  on	  our	  own,	  no	  way.	  We	  could	  never	  raise	  that	  
amount	  of	  capital	  and	  taken	  all	  the	  risk	  ourselves”	  (Community	  actor	  2)	  
One	  of	  the	  intermediaries	  viewed	  shared	  ownership	  as	  a	  way	  to	  overcome	  weaknesses	  in	  the	  
business	  case	  of	  smaller-­‐scale,	  community-­‐led	  projects.	  	  
“It	  [shared	  ownership]	  can	  derisk	  the	  investment.	  And	  most	  community	  groups	  are	  not	  in	  the	  position	  
to	  do	  these	  large	  scale	  projects	  you	  know,	  which	  are	  very	  expensive	  with	  huge	  risk	  involved”	  
(Intermediary	  3)	  
By	  contrast,	  developers	  seem	  to	  engage	  in	  shared	  ownership	  because	  of	  substantive	  (a	  way	  to	  
achieve	  better	  outcomes	  for	  all,	  community	  representatives	  and	  developers	  together)	  or	  even	  more	  
instrumental	  rationales	  	  (a	  better	  way	  to	  achieve	  ends,	  in	  this	  case	  making	  a	  profit)	  (Stirling,	  2005).	  
Most	  often,	  developers	  mentioned	  shared	  ownership	  as	  an	  opportunity	  to	  achieve	  positive	  public	  
relations,	  avoid	  substantial	  protest,	  raise	  funds,	  prevent	  regulation	  and,	  again,	  considerations	  of	  risk	  
were	  focalized,	  most	  prominently	  reducing	  the	  risk	  of	  planning	  refusal.	  Although	  some	  also	  indicated	  
that	  "it	  feels	  good	  to	  engage	  these	  people"	  (Developer	  3)	  (suggesting	  some	  indication	  of	  a	  normative	  
rationale),	  financial	  aspects	  were	  most	  strongly	  emphasized	  by	  all.	  
	  
"[...]	  the	  reason	  that	  we	  are	  doing	  what	  we	  are	  doing	  is	  financial.	  Obviously	  in	  the	  business	  there	  is	  
always	  a	  decisive	  financial	  element"	  (Developer	  4)	  
“We	  really	  have	  three	  main	  reasons;	  first	  of	  all	  because	  of	  government	  incentives,	  second	  because	  we	  
believe	  it	  is	  good	  to	  contribute	  in	  some	  way	  to	  communities,	  and	  also	  for	  PR	  reasons;	  it	  generally	  
helps	  with	  getting	  planning	  permission”	  (Developer	  2)	  
However,	  caution	  is	  needed	  when	  looking	  at	  these	  results	  because	  organizations	  are	  often	  not	  
entities	  with	  a	  single	  view	  on	  shared	  ownership.	  One	  of	  the	  developers	  for	  example	  mentioned	  that:	  
	  
“Although	  the	  general	  director	  is	  keen	  on	  making	  community	  energy	  work,	  the	  financial	  department	  
objects	  as	  soon	  as	  it	  costs	  money,	  and	  it	  generally	  does”	  (Developer	  6)	  
	  
While	  having	  different	  reasons	  for	  engaging	  in	  shared	  ownership	  might	  not	  be	  a	  problem	  a	  priori	  (it	  
could	  be	  a	  win-­‐win	  situation	  as	  mentioned	  by	  the	  Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force	  (2014))	  it	  may	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increase	  the	  potential	  for	  failure	  in	  cases	  of	  clearly	  conflicting	  rationales.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  
expectations	  that	  each	  type	  of	  actor	  has	  of	  the	  other	  has	  some	  importance,	  with	  community	  actors	  
and	  sympathetic	  intermediaries	  expressing	  skepticism	  about	  the	  genuineness	  of	  any	  purported	  
normative	  motives	  for	  companies,	  adding	  to	  the	  challenges	  involved	  when	  third	  parties	  wish	  to	  
broker	  a	  relationship	  between	  the	  parties	  (cf.	  Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  2013):	  	  
	  
“Big	  companies	  may	  have	  a	  real	  mission	  to	  be	  community	  minded	  and	  do	  good	  work	  but	  when	  you	  
really	  get	  to	  the	  nitty	  gritty,	  their	  lawyers	  will	  defend	  their	  assets	  you	  know.	  There	  will	  be	  challenges	  
when	  those	  two	  parties	  want	  to	  interface.”	  (Intermediary	  2)	  
	  
“It	  is	  skills	  you	  know,	  and	  it	  provides	  social	  benefits	  for	  the	  community	  right,	  working	  together,	  
creating	  social	  capital	  these	  kind	  of	  things.	  But	  if	  a	  company	  just	  comes	  in,	  develops	  the	  project	  and	  
then	  just	  says:	  here	  you	  have	  your	  certificates,	  you	  miss	  all	  that.	  It	  is	  almost	  then	  as	  if	  you	  are	  taking	  
the	  heart	  out	  of	  the	  owning	  part”	  (Intermediary	  4)	  
	  
4.3	  Expectations	  of	  trust	  and	  justice	  
4.3.1	  Building	  trust:	  Expectations	  regarding	  developers	  
While	  having	  different	  rationales	  for	  engagement	  might	  be	  part	  of	  the	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  little	  
successful	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements	  were	  identified	  to	  date,	  it	  seems	  that	  negative	  
expectations	  that	  these	  actors	  have	  of	  each	  other	  and	  each	  other’s	  rationales	  is	  most	  problematic	  in	  
terms	  of	  building	  the	  trust	  needed	  (Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Almost	  all	  community	  representatives	  
indicated	  that	  they	  viewed	  developers	  as	  being	  motivated	  in	  principle	  by	  financial	  gains,	  believing	  
that	  the	  act	  of	  involving	  communities	  will	  jeopardize	  this	  profit,	  making	  it	  more	  difficult	  to	  trust	  
developers.	  	  
"It	  is	  really	  almost	  impossible	  to	  have	  a	  really	  amazing	  community	  offer,	  since	  this	  will	  often	  interfere	  
with	  their	  profits	  I	  guess"	  (Community	  actor	  5)	  
"They	  will	  just	  give	  the	  local	  communities	  as	  little	  as	  possible,	  only	  to	  silence	  them	  you	  know"	  
(Community	  actor	  2)	  
It	  was	  suggested	  that	  developers	  may	  deliberately	  exaggerate	  the	  financial	  benefits	  for	  communities	  
of	  participating	  in	  shared	  ownership,	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  local	  support	  for	  their	  proposals:	  
“Sometimes	  they	  [developers]	  are	  making	  offers	  that	  at	  first	  reading	  look	  extremely	  good	  but	  then	  
when	  you	  read	  the	  small	  print,	  they	  are	  never	  going	  to	  deliver.	  They	  do	  that	  to	  get	  support	  of	  the	  
community	  without	  paying	  the	  costs”	  (Intermediary	  5)	  
Furthermore,	  it	  seems	  that	  time	  asymmetries	  may	  introduce	  extra	  risk	  for	  these	  communities	  
(Coleman,	  1990);	  some	  community	  actors	  reported	  feeling	  so	  vulnerable	  that	  a	  developer	  may	  leave	  





“We	  were	  offered	  a	  shared	  ownership	  opportunity	  but	  the	  directors	  [of	  the	  community	  group]	  
decided	  not	  to	  go	  further	  because	  formal	  offers	  are	  often	  only	  made	  in	  a	  later	  stage,	  especially	  after	  
planning	  permission	  is	  being	  gained”	  (Community	  actor	  4)	  
Other	  community	  actors	  regarded	  partnerships	  with	  developers	  as	  an	  increased	  risk	  to	  their	  own	  
status	  within	  the	  community.	  One	  community	  actor	  for	  example	  indicated	  that	  a	  community	  group	  
was	  already	  working	  on	  small-­‐scale	  community-­‐led	  projects	  for	  several	  years	  and	  they	  had	  built	  a	  
trustworthy	  reputation	  within	  the	  community.	  This	  actor	  expressed	  the	  fear	  that	  if	  the	  shared	  
ownership	  partnership	  fell	  through,	  their	  own	  reputation	  would	  be	  at	  stake	  and	  the	  general	  support	  
of	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  within	  the	  community,	  leading	  to	  less	  instead	  of	  more	  affinity	  with	  
renewables	  within	  the	  community.	  	  
“You	  cannot	  have	  [legal]	  complications	  that	  might	  jeopardize	  the	  whole	  enterprise	  because	  if	  we	  
screw	  up	  [shared	  ownership	  falling	  through],	  our	  value	  of	  being	  seen	  as	  trustworthy	  is	  severely	  
threatened”	  (Community	  actor	  3)	  
This	  may	  also	  be	  the	  reason	  why	  locally	  based	  developers	  were	  often	  seen	  as	  more	  trustworthy	  by	  
community	  actors,	  since	  there	  had	  already	  been	  several	  previous	  encounters,	  increasing	  the	  
credibility	  of	  these	  developers	  and	  building	  trust	  between	  both	  parties,	  whereas	  this	  is	  often	  not	  the	  
case	  with	  large-­‐scale	  developers	  coming	  from	  outside	  the	  community	  (Devine-­‐Wright,	  2012).	  Local	  
companies	  were	  mentioned	  as	  being	  "their	  sort	  of	  people"	  and	  the	  distance	  between	  the	  community	  
and	  these	  developers	  seems	  less	  substantial	  both	  geographically	  and	  culturally.	  	  
"The	  thing	  really	  is,	  because	  that	  business	  is	  located	  in	  X	  [local	  area]	  …	  we	  have	  a	  personal	  
relationship	  with	  these	  businesses,	  making	  it	  much	  easier	  than	  it	  would	  be	  when	  negotiating	  with	  
commercials	  from	  outside"	  (Community	  actor	  3)	  
	  
4.3.2	  Building	  trust:	  Expectations	  regarding	  communities	  
For	  developers,	  the	  story	  seems	  twofold.	  In	  general,	  they	  seem	  to	  believe	  that	  “the	  public”	  is	  
supportive	  of	  renewable	  energy	  in	  general	  and	  community	  actors	  are	  willing	  to	  engage	  in	  shared	  
ownership	  projects.	  Some	  fears	  were	  expressed	  however,	  that	  active	  participation	  could	  foster	  
protest,	  and	  some	  developers	  mentioned	  being	  cautious	  about	  communicating	  with	  communities	  
too	  often.	  	  
"Maybe	  it	  is	  a	  British	  thing	  but	  yeah	  people	  don't	  really	  focalize	  when	  they	  are	  in	  favor	  of	  something,	  
but	  they	  certainly	  do	  when	  they	  are	  against	  it"	  (Developer	  6)	  
Many	  community	  actors	  indicated	  that	  they	  found	  developers	  hard	  to	  reach,	  and	  reluctant	  to	  provide	  
information	  outside	  of	  formal	  meetings.	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  to	  indicate	  that	  developers	  engage	  in	  mostly	  
one-­‐way	  information	  provision	  communication	  strategies	  (Cass	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Barnett	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  This	  
may	  jeopardize	  the	  chance	  of	  building	  trust.	  However,	  this	  way	  of	  communicating	  with	  communities	  
does	  not	  only	  seem	  to	  be	  related	  to	  fears	  for	  protest	  (Burningham	  et	  al.,	  2015)	  but	  also	  concerns	  
about	  these	  negotiations	  taking	  too	  much	  time	  and	  threatening	  finances.	  Thus,	  whereas	  for	  
community	  actors	  trust	  seems	  to	  be	  influenced	  negatively	  because	  in	  general	  they	  express	  doubts	  
about	  the	  rationales	  of	  developers,	  for	  developers	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  concern	  with	  the	  ability	  
of	  community	  representatives	  to	  ‘deliver’	  their	  side	  of	  shared	  ownership:	  
14	  
	  
"Communities	  often	  lack	  legal	  and	  technological	  knowledge	  and	  so	  are	  they	  really	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
raise	  these	  funds	  within	  the	  time-­‐frame?	  It	  is	  a	  risk	  you	  know,	  communities	  have	  no	  clue	  in	  general	  
where	  they	  get	  themselves	  into	  really"	  (Developer	  2)	  
This	  may	  be	  especially	  the	  case	  in	  areas	  where	  communities	  do	  not	  have	  already	  established	  
community	  groups	  to	  lead	  these	  collaborations	  (Bomberg	  &	  McEwen,	  2012).	  	  
	  
“Things	  can	  go	  very	  very	  slowly	  in	  communities	  where	  no	  community	  groups	  are	  present,	  it	  is	  much	  
easier	  when	  the	  community	  is	  already	  a	  bit	  organized”	  (Developer	  3)	  
One	  developer	  mentioned	  paying	  for	  the	  organization	  of	  a	  community	  group	  themselves,	  which	  was	  
indicated	  as	  a	  significant	  risk	  in	  financial	  terms	  and	  a	  time-­‐consuming	  activity	  (in	  contrast	  to	  what	  the	  
Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force	  (2014)	  mentioned	  about	  being	  the	  process	  being	  cost-­‐neutral	  for	  both	  
parties).	  Another	  developer	  mentioned	  having	  organized	  a	  weekend	  where	  community	  members,	  
experts,	  accountants,	  and	  lawyers	  were	  brought	  together,	  while	  admitting	  that	  this	  is	  probably	  only	  
feasible	  in	  terms	  of	  time	  and	  money	  if	  it	  concerns	  large-­‐scale	  projects.	  	  
	  	  
4.5	  Procedural	  and	  distributive	  justice	   	  
4.5.1	  Justice	  between	  communities	  and	  developers	  
Concerning	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  justice,	  issues	  of	  procedural	  justice	  were	  mentioned	  more	  often	  
than	  distributive	  justice,	  and	  more	  commonly	  by	  community	  actors	  and	  some	  intermediaries	  than	  
developers.	  The	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  procedural	  justice	  may	  be	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  timing	  when	  the	  
research	  was	  conducted,	  with	  shared	  ownership	  being	  a	  relatively	  novel	  idea	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  
process	  of	  identifying	  and	  negotiating	  projects,	  with	  outcomes	  not	  yet	  finalized.	  Why	  there	  was	  
greater	  emphasis	  on	  issues	  of	  justice	  by	  community	  and	  intermediary	  actors	  than	  developers	  is	  
unclear	  –	  perhaps	  these	  issues	  were	  less	  important	  to	  developers	  (as	  Walker	  and	  Devine-­‐Wright’s	  
(2008)	  framework	  might	  suggest)	  or	  perhaps	  developers	  faced	  less	  difficulty	  regarding	  these	  issues	  
arising	  from	  pre-­‐existing	  asymmetries	  of	  power.	  These	  are	  notable	  findings	  that	  deserve	  further	  
research.	  
Regarding	  procedural	  justice,	  both	  community	  actors	  and	  intermediaries	  expressed	  skepticism	  
concerning	  the	  prospect	  for	  genuine	  participation	  within	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements.	  This	  
seems	  to	  be	  based	  upon	  the	  expectations	  that	  community	  actors	  have	  of	  developers	  and	  the	  trust	  (or	  
lack	  of)	  that	  resides	  between	  them.	  In	  particular,	  a	  perceived	  lack	  of	  equality	  in	  decision-­‐making	  was	  
a	  concern	  of	  many	  community	  actors,	  with	  developers	  seen	  as	  making	  most	  of	  the	  decisions	  and	  
communities	  being	  merely	  consulted	  after	  the	  fact.	  	  
"They	  [developers]	  will	  never	  allow	  you	  take	  a	  place	  on	  the	  table	  where	  the	  decisions	  are	  being	  made,	  
that	  will	  interfere	  with	  their	  business.	  Their	  lawyers	  are	  going	  to	  defend	  their	  assets	  you	  know"	  
(Community	  actor	  5)	  
	  “These	  sides	  aren't	  equal	  when	  they	  come	  together,	  the	  developer	  holds	  all	  the	  cards.	  Ehm	  because	  
they	  are	  only	  interested	  in	  getting	  through	  planning	  permission,	  and	  that	  is	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  you	  
can	  really	  help	  them	  with,	  the	  planning	  permission.	  And	  once	  they	  have	  that	  they	  have	  a	  product,	  and	  
they	  do	  not	  need	  you	  anymore”	  (Community	  actor	  1)	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Furthermore,	  risk	  was	  mentioned	  in	  all	  interviews	  and	  seems	  to	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  in	  the	  decision-­‐
making	  of	  these	  actors.	  Both	  for	  community	  actors	  and	  developers	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  more	  
(perceived)	  risk	  is	  incorporated	  by	  a	  certain	  actor,	  the	  more	  they	  want	  to	  have	  a	  say	  about	  the	  
development	  of	  the	  project.	  	  
“Yeah	  you	  are	  talking	  about	  shared	  owner[ship]	  but	  the	  companies	  are	  often	  taking	  all	  the	  risk,	  so	  the	  
community	  might	  be	  [a]	  shared	  owner	  but	  they	  cannot	  get	  to	  any	  of	  the	  board	  meetings	  where	  the	  
big	  decisions	  are	  being	  made”	  (Intermediary	  4)	  
	  
Deficiencies	  in	  procedural	  justice	  were	  manifest	  by	  concerns	  over	  the	  method	  and	  timing	  of	  
involvement.	  Community	  actors	  mentioned	  being	  engaged	  at	  a	  late	  stage	  in	  the	  process,	  after	  the	  
developer	  already	  decided	  key	  parameters.	  This	  not	  only	  seems	  to	  hinder	  active	  involvement	  but	  also	  
decreases	  opportunities	  to	  build	  trust	  between	  the	  parties	  -­‐	  if	  communities	  are	  only	  involved	  at	  a	  late	  
stage,	  there	  is	  less	  time	  available	  to	  remedy	  any	  pre-­‐existing	  mistrust	  on	  both	  sides.	  	  
“We	  are	  trying	  to	  jump	  on	  the	  bus	  while	  the	  bus	  is	  moving,	  it	  would	  be	  nice	  if	  we	  could	  have	  been	  
involved	  from	  the	  concept	  stage	  onwards,	  pre-­‐planning	  and	  planning”	  (Community	  actor	  4)	  
Community	  actors	  sought	  to	  achieve	  greater	  control	  in	  two	  ways.	  First,	  by	  taking	  a	  more	  active	  rather	  
than	  reactive	  role	  in	  shared	  ownership,	  seeking	  to	  initiate	  negotiations	  with	  developers	  rather	  than	  
responding	  to	  developers’	  inquiries,	  thus	  ensuring	  involvement	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage.	  Second,	  by	  
choosing	  to	  work	  with	  private	  companies	  that	  were	  based	  in	  the	  local	  area	  and	  already	  known,	  with	  
whom	  they	  had	  already	  formed	  relationships	  of	  trust	  (see	  section	  4.3.1	  above).	  This	  not	  only	  enabled	  
better	  relationships,	  but	  also	  greater	  local	  benefit	  -­‐	  community	  actors	  defined	  this	  as	  a	  preference	  for	  
"keeping	  the	  money	  within	  the	  community"	  (Community	  actor	  6).	  
	  “We	  get	  that	  [participation]	  by	  the	  community	  itself	  taking	  charge	  and	  then	  forming	  partnerships	  
rather	  than	  developers	  coming	  in	  and	  say	  ok	  we	  offer	  you	  this	  and	  then	  you	  form	  a	  partnership	  to	  
handle	  that”	  (Community	  actor	  4)	  
"It	  is	  a	  way	  to	  maximize	  the	  benefits	  of	  community	  energy	  and	  those	  benefits	  include,	  benefits	  to	  the	  
local	  economy,	  which	  includes	  such	  things	  as	  money	  that	  we	  spend	  directly	  into	  the	  local	  economy"	  
(Community	  actor	  3)	  
In	  relation	  to	  distributive	  justice,	  the	  size	  of	  shared	  ownership	  projects	  was	  regarded	  as	  a	  potential	  
problem.	  The	  Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force	  (2014)	  proposed	  that	  sharing	  ownership	  should	  be	  
normative	  only	  in	  renewable	  energy	  projects	  valued	  at	  greater	  than	  £2.5	  million	  (noting	  the	  
distinctive	  approach	  taken	  in	  Scotland	  where	  smaller	  projects	  were	  also	  deemed	  suitable	  for	  shared	  
ownership,	  Local	  Energy	  Scotland,	  2015).	  While	  some	  community	  actors	  and	  developers	  viewed	  this	  
cut-­‐off	  as	  very	  reasonable	  in	  terms	  of	  providing	  substantial	  benefits	  to	  communities	  and	  their	  ability	  
to	  raise	  funds,	  others	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  smaller	  or	  poorer	  communities	  to	  raise	  
sufficient	  funds	  in	  projects	  of	  this	  scale,	  something	  already	  mentioned	  when	  looking	  at	  the	  
expectations	  that	  developers	  hold	  of	  community	  leaders.	  The	  point	  made	  was	  that	  if	  local	  residents	  
are	  unable	  to	  raise	  sufficient	  capital	  to	  provide	  their	  share	  of	  a	  larger	  project,	  this	  could	  necessitate	  
opening	  up	  share	  offers	  to	  individuals	  living	  outside	  of	  the	  local	  area,	  which	  would	  lessen	  the	  ‘local-­‐




"For	  most	  communities	  this	  will	  be	  impossible	  really,	  and	  they	  will	  never	  be	  able	  to	  raise	  money	  
needed	  to	  buy	  the	  shares	  in	  these	  projects.	  For	  that	  to	  happen,	  projects	  need	  to	  stay	  under	  a	  million"	  
(Community	  actor	  6)	  
Importantly,	  there	  was	  heterogeneity	  in	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  concerns	  about	  procedural	  and	  
distributional	  justice	  in	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements	  seemed	  to	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  community	  
actors.	  For	  some,	  a	  sense	  of	  pragmatism	  was	  dominant	  leading	  them	  to	  accept	  ‘what	  was	  on	  the	  
table’,	  whereas	  for	  others,	  it	  seemed	  to	  clash	  with	  a	  more	  ‘purist’	  view	  of	  community	  energy	  
(Hargreaves	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  For	  example,	  one	  community	  energy	  actor	  stated	  that	  a	  developer	  might	  
work	  with	  another	  community	  if	  their	  negotiations	  failed	  or	  that	  developers	  would	  just	  pick	  another	  
community	  to	  collaborate	  with.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  different	  rationales	  of	  
community	  actors;	  communities	  that	  are	  more	  financially	  or	  environmentally	  motivated	  seem	  to	  
accept	  more	  easily	  what	  is	  offered	  by	  developers	  than	  communities	  who	  are	  more	  focused	  on	  social	  
aspects	  of	  these	  projects	  (such	  as	  social	  cohesion),	  since	  for	  them	  a	  larger	  project	  would	  represent	  a	  
stronger	  response	  to	  climate	  change	  and	  yield	  greater	  financial	  returns	  compared	  to	  community	  
actors	  who	  are	  more	  concerned	  with	  social	  benefits.	  This	  underlies	  the	  heterogeneity	  within	  the	  
Community	  Energy	  sector,	  as	  manifest	  in	  the	  literature	  by	  the	  alternative	  spaces	  for	  community	  
energy	  in	  the	  two	  dimensional	  framework	  (Walker	  &	  Devine-­‐Wright,	  2008)	  and	  distinctions	  made	  
between	  ‘market	  oriented’	  and	  ‘grassroots’	  citizen	  participation	  initiatives	  (Hatzlet	  al.,	  2016).	  
	  
Whether	  community	  actors	  choose	  a	  more	  pragmatic	  strategy	  also	  seems	  to	  depend	  on	  their	  
attitudes	  towards	  perceived	  power	  inequalities	  that	  were	  already	  mentioned	  between	  these	  actors	  
and	  a	  developer.	  In	  general,	  when	  they	  feel	  they	  are	  in	  a	  weaker	  position	  in	  negotiating	  a	  fair	  deal,	  
they	  seem	  to	  more	  easily	  ‘take	  what	  is	  on	  the	  table’.	  Although	  shared	  ownership	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  
be	  more	  efficient	  compared	  to	  community-­‐led	  projects,	  efficiency	  seems	  to	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  
active	  engagement	  and	  social	  benefits	  for	  the	  community.	  	  
	  
“Chances	  are	  that	  if	  you	  do	  not	  get	  into	  it,	  others	  will	  and	  often	  these	  companies	  will	  not	  be	  keen	  on	  
working	  with	  lots	  of	  these	  community	  groups	  I	  reckon,	  we	  just	  take	  what	  is	  on	  the	  table”	  (Community	  
actor	  5)	  
“It	  (shared	  ownership)	  is	  good,	  it	  is	  better	  than	  nothing,	  but	  for	  me	  that	  should	  not	  be	  the	  main,	  it	  is	  
not	  how	  you	  get	  maximum	  benefit	  from	  community	  engagement,	  you	  have	  to	  think	  about	  what	  is	  
most	  important"	  (Community	  actor	  3)	  
Some	  community	  actors	  were	  critical	  of	  the	  UK	  Government’s	  support	  for	  shared	  ownership	  in	  the	  
sense	  that	  it	  seemed	  unfair	  to	  build	  national	  energy	  policy	  around	  expectations	  of	  voluntary	  input	  by	  
community	  actors,	  an	  argument	  which	  hints	  back	  to	  doubts	  about	  the	  cost-­‐neutrality	  of	  these	  
partnerships	  and	  the	  professionalization	  (or	  lack	  of)	  in	  the	  community	  energy	  sector.	  	  
"So	  there	  is	  huge	  amount	  of	  free	  time	  given	  by	  individuals	  and	  I	  think	  the	  government	  should	  
recognize	  that	  and	  any	  research	  project	  should....	  [....]	  When	  we	  would	  be	  charged	  in	  our	  wages	  this	  
would	  stack	  up	  to	  any	  millions	  that	  the	  government	  is	  getting	  for	  free"	  (Community	  actor	  5)	  
	  
As	  remarked	  above,	  developer	  participants	  were	  less	  likely	  to	  mention	  issues	  of	  justice	  in	  comparison	  
to	  community	  and	  intermediary	  actors.	  In	  relation	  to	  procedural	  justice,	  the	  pace	  of	  projects	  was	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presented	  as	  simply	  a	  ‘reality’	  of	  how	  things	  work	  out	  in	  practice,	  and	  therefore	  being	  above	  
negotiation:	  
	  
"Well,	  the	  idea	  is	  good,	  but	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  developers	  have	  to	  do	  things	  in	  a	  hurry,	  and	  you	  know,	  
there	  is	  no	  time	  to	  do	  things	  properly	  with	  the	  communities.	  Unless	  that	  community	  is	  already	  very	  
well	  organized"	  (Developer	  3	  
	  
Three	  of	  the	  developer	  participants	  stated	  that	  they	  felt	  pressured	  to	  ensure	  a	  timely	  completion	  of	  
the	  project,	  leading	  to	  a	  preference	  to	  deal	  with	  communities	  that	  already	  have	  a	  community	  group	  
up	  and	  running.	  Whilst	  the	  rationale	  for	  doing	  this	  is	  undoubtedly	  pragmatic,	  as	  a	  principle	  for	  taking	  
forward	  shared	  ownership	  of	  renewable	  energy	  projects,	  this	  risks	  reinforcing	  existing	  inequalities	  
between	  communities	  that	  already	  differ	  in	  access	  to	  resources	  (e.g.	  skills,	  influence,	  knowledge),	  
and	  therefore	  may	  perpetuate	  socio-­‐economic	  injustice	  (Catney,	  MacGregor,	  Dobson,	  Hall,	  Royston,	  
Robinson,	  Ormerod	  &	  Rosse,	  2014).	  In	  relation	  to	  distributive	  justice,	  one	  developer	  participant	  
emphasized	  the	  price	  of	  shares:	  	  	  
	  “With	  regard	  to	  buying	  these	  shares,	  because	  we	  try	  to	  make	  them	  as	  accessible	  as	  possible,	  making	  
the	  cheapest	  ones	  [….]	  in	  order	  to	  get	  as	  many	  people	  involved”	  (Developer	  1).	  
As	  above,	  this	  position	  may	  be	  founded	  as	  much	  on	  pragmatism	  –	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  that	  sufficient	  
capital	  is	  raised	  to	  move	  forward	  with	  a	  project	  –	  as	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  including	  as	  many	  local	  
residents	  as	  possible	  and	  ensuring	  the	  greatest	  degree	  of	  local	  benefit	  sharing.	  
4.5.2	  Considerations	  of	  justice	  within	  communities	  
In	  addition	  to	  concerns	  about	  justice	  between	  developers	  and	  communities,	  the	  interviews	  revealed	  
concerns	  about	  justice	  within	  communities.	  Again,	  justice	  was	  often	  mentioned	  in	  relation	  to	  
different	  perceptions	  that	  actors	  hold	  of	  one	  another.	  For	  example,	  some	  of	  the	  developers	  
mentioned	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  in	  the	  representativeness	  of	  community	  actors.	  One	  developer	  indicated	  
that	  a	  few	  retired	  people	  who	  have	  an	  interest	  in	  these	  projects	  and	  who	  often	  get	  to	  divide	  the	  
benefits,	  are	  running	  the	  local	  parish	  councils	  that	  they	  have	  to	  engage	  with.	  	  
“I	  think,	  you	  also	  need	  to	  assure	  that	  the	  group	  you	  are	  dealing	  with	  is	  actually	  representative.	  
Because	  you	  may	  have	  a	  very	  passionate	  community	  energy	  group,	  made	  out	  of	  a	  few	  individuals	  
who	  have	  a	  very	  clear	  idea	  of	  what	  they	  want	  to	  achieve,	  but	  that	  might	  not	  represent	  the	  wider	  view	  
and	  actually	  the	  rest	  of	  community	  might	  much	  prefer	  for	  example	  to	  have	  generous	  community	  
benefit	  fund”	  (Developer	  4)	  
Acknowledging	  a	  potential	  gap	  between	  the	  principle	  of	  participation	  and	  the	  practice	  of	  shared	  
ownership,	  community	  representatives	  mentioned	  the	  difficulties	  they	  faced	  in	  mobilizing	  sufficient	  
and	  diverse	  local	  residents	  to	  gain	  support	  for	  shared	  ownership:	  	  
"With	  regard	  to	  these	  workshops	  [informing	  the	  community],	  generally	  only	  highly	  educated,	  middle	  
aged	  people	  drop	  by,	  who	  have	  some	  cash	  they	  want	  to	  invest"	  (Community	  actor	  5)	  
This	  raises	  questions	  about	  the	  position	  of	  community	  actors	  to	  represent	  ‘the	  community’	  in	  their	  
negotiations	  with	  developers	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  community	  participation	  actually	  achieved.	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When	  looking	  at	  the	  distribution	  of	  benefits	  within	  these	  communities,	  findings	  were	  mixed.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  as	  mentioned	  earlier,	  shared	  ownership	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  potentially	  increasing	  participation	  
in	  renewable	  energy	  within	  the	  community	  when	  shares	  are	  sold	  to	  residents	  at	  sufficiently	  low	  
prices.	  On	  the	  other,	  it	  is	  arguable	  whether	  the	  purchase	  of	  shares	  by	  individual	  residents	  still	  entails	  
a	  genuine	  community-­‐based	  shared	  ownership	  arrangement	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  Task	  Force	  (2014).	  
Many	  community	  actors	  were	  doubtful	  of	  the	  distributive	  fairness	  of	  such	  arrangements	  and	  
indicated	  that	  only	  a	  small	  group	  of	  stakeholders	  might	  benefit.	  It	  seems	  then,	  that	  shared	  ownership	  
has	  the	  potential	  to	  increase	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  revenues	  from	  a	  project,	  but	  it	  remains	  much	  less	  
clear	  if	  it	  also	  contributes	  to	  increasing	  distributive	  justice	  within	  communities.	  	  
4.6 Influence	  of	  the	  wider	  policy	  context	  	  
There	  was	  consensus	  among	  all	  participants	  that	  making	  shared	  ownership	  work	  in	  practice	  was	  
hampered	  by	  a	  ‘macro’	  level	  instability	  in	  UK	  energy	  policy.	  Chief	  amongst	  these	  concerns	  was	  the	  
series	  of	  digressions	  recently	  announced	  to	  the	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs,	  which	  were	  said	  to	  deter	  innovation	  
and	  lessen	  the	  time	  available	  for	  genuine	  community	  participation:	  
“So	  for	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  the	  competition	  is	  that	  you	  have	  to	  get	  your	  project	  done	  before	  the	  rates	  go	  
down,	  because	  the	  government	  said	  the	  tariff	  will	  go	  down	  and	  down,	  so	  the	  quicker	  you	  do	  it,	  the	  
more	  money	  you	  get.	  There	  is	  massive	  commercial	  pressures	  on	  the	  sector,	  and	  that	  just	  makes	  it	  
much	  harder	  to	  do	  anything	  different	  really”	  (Intermediary	  3)	  
The	  many	  changes	  in	  the	  regulations	  (ranging	  from	  a	  reduction	  in	  feed-­‐in	  tariffs	  to	  emerging	  policies	  
perceived	  as	  anti-­‐onshore	  wind)	  were	  said	  to	  increase	  the	  risk	  to	  invest	  in	  projects	  thereby	  hindering	  
the	  general	  entrepreneurial	  climate.	  Some	  community	  actors,	  for	  example,	  stated	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  
engage	  in	  shared	  ownership	  arrangements	  and	  were	  actively	  looking	  for	  developers	  but	  expressed	  
worries	  that	  with	  recent	  cuts	  in	  finances	  from	  the	  government,	  developers	  are	  increasingly	  hesitant	  
to	  start	  developing	  these	  sites.	  
"It	  is	  not	  helped	  by	  the	  government	  keeping	  on	  changing	  the	  goalposts,	  it	  changes	  the	  regulation	  
every	  few	  months…	  there	  is	  no	  stability	  in	  the	  market”	  (Community	  actor	  3)	  
“Also	  with	  our	  project,	  we	  did	  the	  calculations	  with	  what	  the	  figures	  were	  back	  then,	  if	  they	  change	  
them	  all	  of	  a	  sudden,	  the	  viability	  of	  the	  project	  can	  change	  completely.	  And	  don’t	  forget	  that	  is	  also	  a	  
huge	  risk	  for	  these	  communities”	  (Developer	  2)	  
This	  increased	  risk	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  interrelated	  again	  with	  issues	  of	  trust.	  As	  mentioned	  before,	  
actors	  may	  be	  more	  concerned	  with	  establishing	  trust	  relations	  in	  long-­‐term	  projects	  (Axelrod,	  1984;	  
Walker	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  for	  which	  stability	  is	  needed.	  It	  seems	  that	  instability	  in	  current	  energy	  policy	  
does	  not	  enable	  this	  to	  happen,	  even	  when	  there	  is	  willingness	  from	  both	  parties.	  Finally,	  there	  was	  
little	  consensus	  about	  whether	  shared	  ownership	  should	  become	  a	  mandatory	  policy.	  Community	  
actors	  tended	  to	  favor	  placing	  an	  obligation	  on	  developers,	  arising	  from	  a	  desire	  for	  stability	  and	  a	  
sense	  of	  mistrust	  in	  the	  motives	  of	  companies.	  	  





Companies	  were	  uniformly	  resistant	  to	  mandatory	  policy	  on	  grounds	  of	  increased	  risk	  and	  cost	  as	  
well	  as	  doubts	  about	  the	  feasibility	  of	  sharing	  ownership,	  including	  whether	  it	  was	  actually	  sought	  by	  
the	  public	  more	  generally.	  One	  intermediary	  pointed	  to	  the	  risk	  that	  making	  the	  policy	  mandatory	  
would	  fail	  to	  foster	  creativity	  and	  flexibility	  in	  how	  shared	  ownership	  was	  delivered	  on	  the	  ground,	  
while	  being	  sensitive	  to	  differences	  across	  communities	  and	  contexts.	  
	  
“I	  think	  the	  difficulty	  with	  the	  mandatory	  thing	  is,	  you	  know,	  the	  risk	  is	  that	  it	  becomes	  too	  




These	  findings	  suggest	  that	  early	  efforts	  to	  make	  shared	  ownership	  work	  in	  practice	  in	  the	  UK	  have	  
proved	  difficult,	  despite	  high	  levels	  of	  support	  in	  principle.	  A	  consistent	  finding	  is	  that	  shared	  
ownership	  is	  undermined	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  trust,	  with	  negative	  expectations	  of	  the	  different	  parties	  of	  one	  
another.	  Community	  actors	  viewed	  developers	  as	  instrumentally	  using	  the	  prospect	  of	  shared	  
ownership	  to	  secure	  planning	  consent	  before	  abandoning	  these	  plans	  once	  consent	  is	  secured.	  
Developers	  viewed	  community	  leaders	  as	  unrepresentative	  of	  the	  wider	  community,	  and	  being	  
unable	  to	  progress	  their	  part	  of	  the	  deal	  through	  a	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  and	  skills.	  These	  expectations	  in	  
turn	  play	  a	  role	  in	  reducing	  a	  willingness	  to	  take	  risks	  and	  adopt	  new	  practices.	  This	  then	  creates	  a	  
negative	  feedback	  loop,	  as	  proposed	  by	  Walker	  et	  al.	  (2011),	  where	  negative	  expectations	  of	  the	  
other	  reduces	  a	  willingness	  to	  engage	  in	  collaborative	  practice,	  which	  in	  turn	  bolsters	  a	  lack	  of	  trust	  
in	  the	  other.	  	  
At	  one	  level,	  our	  findings	  concerning	  lack	  of	  trust	  and	  negative	  expectations	  are	  unsurprising.	  Shared	  
ownership	  is	  a	  hybrid	  idea	  that	  could	  be	  considered	  disruptive	  both	  to	  normative	  ideas	  and	  practices	  
of	  ‘commercial	  energy’	  and	  ‘community	  energy’.	  As	  such,	  the	  idea	  that	  shared	  ownership	  might	  
represent	  a	  ‘win-­‐win’	  solution	  (Shared	  Ownership	  Task	  Force,	  2014)	  for	  companies	  and	  communities	  
would	  seem	  unlikely.	  Company-­‐led	  projects	  are	  founded	  upon	  a	  capitalist,	  neo-­‐liberal	  ideology	  in	  
which	  government	  intervention	  is	  to	  be	  avoided	  and	  market	  solutions	  preferred.	  This	  is	  clear	  from	  
the	  responses	  of	  company	  representatives	  in	  this	  study,	  who	  uniformly	  wished	  to	  avoid	  regulation	  on	  
shared	  ownership.	  By	  contrast,	  community-­‐led	  energy	  is	  founded	  upon	  communitarian	  beliefs	  
(Etzioni,	  1993;	  Walker,	  2007),	  in	  which	  strong	  communities	  are	  viewed	  as	  an	  end	  in	  themselves,	  not	  a	  
means	  to	  an	  end,	  and	  therefore	  are	  most	  appropriate	  to	  instigate	  and	  undertake	  renewable	  energy	  
projects.	  Strong	  support	  for	  either	  ideology	  might	  lead	  actors	  to	  view	  shared	  ownership	  with	  
skepticism,	  for	  example	  seeing	  shared	  ownership	  as	  a	  tokenistic	  form	  of	  community	  participation	  or	  
as	  an	  unwanted	  and	  risky	  intrusion	  into	  company	  practices.	  
Yet	  our	  findings	  make	  clear	  that	  there	  are	  heterogeneous	  views	  across	  both	  company	  and	  
community	  sectors	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  this	  is	  significant	  in	  terms	  of	  suggesting	  at	  least	  some	  positive	  
prospects	  for	  shared	  ownership	  in	  the	  future.	  Some	  developers	  indicated	  a	  greater	  willingness	  to	  
engage	  with	  communities	  than	  others.	  Some	  community	  actors	  indicated	  a	  greater	  willingness	  to	  
forego	  some	  degree	  of	  participation	  in	  order	  to	  gain	  more	  financial	  benefits.	  We	  conclude	  that	  
successful	  cases	  of	  shared	  ownership	  are	  most	  likely	  to	  occur,	  at	  least	  at	  this	  early	  stage,	  when	  
partnerships	  are	  negotiated	  between	  developers	  that	  express	  a	  normative	  rationale	  for	  community	  
engagement	  and	  pragmatic	  community	  actors	  that	  are	  prepared	  to	  accept	  what	  developers	  might	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offer,	  and	  least	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  instrumentally	  motivated	  developers	  engage	  with	  community	  
actors	  less	  willing	  to	  compromise	  on	  the	  ‘principles’	  of	  community	  energy.	  
Even	  when	  such	  a	  meeting	  of	  minds	  occurs,	  our	  findings	  point	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  practicalities	  
of	  suitable	  ‘matchmaking’,	  either	  by	  the	  actors	  themselves	  or	  brokered	  by	  intermediaries	  –	  and	  
spaces	  for	  dialogue	  between	  each	  side	  can	  play	  an	  important	  role	  to	  enable	  this	  process.	  New	  
measures	  to	  promote	  shared	  ownership	  could	  aim	  to	  lessen	  the	  risk	  to	  developers	  and	  increase	  the	  
time	  available	  for	  genuine	  community	  engagement,	  for	  example	  by	  putting	  in	  place	  measures	  to	  
enable	  communities	  to	  mobilize	  on	  local	  energy	  opportunities	  prior	  to	  developer	  approaches	  (e.g.	  as	  
part	  of	  neighborhood	  planning	  procedures).	  This	  might	  enable	  community	  leaders	  to	  negotiate	  on	  
more	  equal	  terms,	  foster	  substantial	  communication	  between	  parties	  and	  build	  trust,	  and	  ensure	  
greater	  equity	  between	  communities	  in	  participating	  in	  the	  low	  carbon	  transition.	  This	  might	  then	  go	  
some	  way	  towards	  securing	  a	  ‘win-­‐win’	  situation	  for	  all	  parties	  involved.	  	  
However,	  even	  if	  these	  ‘micro’	  conditions	  are	  met,	  our	  findings	  suggest	  that	  ‘macro’	  issues	  of	  wider	  
policy	  instability	  can	  erode	  the	  willingness	  of	  different	  parties	  to	  take	  risks	  and	  to	  innovate	  normative	  
practices.	  For	  shared	  ownership	  to	  become	  commonplace,	  stability	  in	  government	  support	  for	  
renewable	  energy	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider,	  managed	  low	  carbon	  transition	  is	  required	  (Loorbach	  &	  
Rotmans,	  2006).	  That	  support	  is	  much	  less	  clear	  in	  2016	  than	  it	  was	  in	  2014	  when	  the	  UK	  
Government	  launched	  the	  Community	  Energy	  Strategy	  and	  first	  proposed	  their	  support	  for	  shared	  
ownership.	  It	  is	  also	  notable	  that	  the	  Scottish	  Government	  has	  already	  put	  many	  of	  these	  measures	  
in	  place	  (Local	  Energy	  Scotland,	  2016),	  reflecting	  quite	  distinct	  approaches	  to	  renewable	  energy	  
policy	  across	  the	  devolved	  governments	  of	  the	  U.K.	  
To	  conclude,	  our	  findings	  represent	  an	  important	  step	  in	  better	  understanding	  the	  challenges	  
involved	  in	  implementing	  shared	  ownership	  of	  renewable	  energy	  projects.	  We	  recommend	  that	  
future	  research	  extend	  these	  findings,	  both	  in	  the	  UK	  and	  elsewhere,	  in	  several	  ways.	  First,	  we	  
suggest	  that	  research	  investigates	  the	  different	  ways	  that	  community	  involvement	  in	  shared	  
ownership	  is	  proposed,	  and	  what	  beliefs	  and	  norms	  underlie	  these	  (e.g.	  participation	  by	  collectives	  
vs.	  individuals;	  participation	  by	  local	  residents	  vs.	  citizens	  living	  elsewhere).	  Second,	  it	  would	  be	  
fruitful	  to	  deepen	  understanding	  of	  the	  heterogeneity	  found	  in	  this	  study	  within	  categories	  of	  
community	  energy	  and	  developer	  participants	  in	  their	  expectations	  of,	  approaches	  to,	  and	  
opportunities	  to	  participate	  in	  shared	  ownership	  (Van	  der	  Horst	  &	  Toke,	  2010;	  Catney	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  as	  
suggested,	  for	  example,	  by	  recent	  research	  that	  distinguishes	  between	  ‘grassroots’	  and	  ‘market-­‐led’	  
citizen	  participation	  initiatives	  (Hatzl	  et	  al.,	  2016).	  Third,	  research	  can	  investigate	  the	  potential	  for	  
shared	  ownership	  to	  exacerbate	  existing	  levels	  of	  injustice	  (Catney	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  particularly	  in	  terms	  
of	  distributional	  aspects,	  as	  suggested	  here	  by	  the	  preference	  for	  developers	  to	  work	  with	  already	  
formed	  and	  engaged	  community	  groups.	  Finally,	  further	  research	  on	  shared	  ownership	  is	  required	  
not	  just	  in	  the	  UK,	  but	  in	  countries	  such	  as	  Denmark,	  Germany	  and	  Belgium	  where	  some	  form	  of	  
shared	  ownership	  has	  already	  been	  adopted.	  Comparative	  international	  research	  can	  help	  to	  clarify	  
the	  role	  of	  	  ‘macro’	  level	  processes,	  for	  example	  contrasting	  the	  ‘Energiewende’	  in	  Germany	  (Buchan	  
2012)	  with	  recent	  policy	  changes	  in	  the	  UK,	  and	  how	  these	  interact	  with	  ‘micro’	  level	  process	  to	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